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I
INTRODUCTION
TIHOUGH PROSAIC, it will be necessary for the sake of orderly develop-
ment to begin by defining the object of our attentions, i.e. the defense of
entrapment in criminal prosecutions both state and federal.
(Entrapment is the) conception and planning of an offense by an of-
ficer and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have
perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer.'
This is the authoritative statement of the concept first given by Justice
Owen Roberts, concurring in Sorrells v. United States, the landmark
United States Supreme Court case on entrapment. Variously phrased, Mr.
Justice Roberts' definition now appears in and is accepted by virtually all
reference works as the classic description of the defense.2
This proscribed practice of entrapment typically occurs in the follow-
ing manner: Officers charged with enforcement of various laws, (usually
those directed against consensual crime in which no ready complainant is
available, such as prostitution, gambling, or narcotics violations) will, be-
cause of suspicion based on varying degrees of reasonableness, approach
a suspected violator and request his participation in the illegal activity or
transaction. To illustrate Professor Donnelly of Yale Law School relates
(his sources are not given) that the "invariable pattern" in narcotics cases
is as follows:
An informer, employed by the government, is searched by a narcotics
agent, given money (usually marked) and told to make a purchase of
drugs. The agent follows the informer and observes the transaction be-
* B.S., Rockhurst (1950); LL.B., Univ. of Missouri, Kansas City (1962); LL.M., North-
western Univ. (1963). Trial Attorney United States Dept. of Justice, Organized Crime and
Racketeering Section. Member, Missouri Bar.
[The views expressed in this article are not intended to reflect an official position of the
United States Department of Justice or any Division thereof. They are solely the personal
views of the author.]
I Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 454 (1932).
2 See, for example, 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, §45 (2) (1961); BLAcK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th
ed. 1951); CLARK & MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES, §5:13 (1958); I. BURDICK, THE LAW OF
CRIMES, §195 (1946).
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tween the defendant and the informer. The agent then receives the in-
criminating packet from the informer.
Only too frequently the officer or the stool pigeon, in an excessive and
corrupt desire to obtain a conviction, has actually persuaded a thereto-
fore law abiding person to commit a crime.3
This paper will treat the defense of entrapment in criminal prosecutions,
its development, theory and the major problems concerning its application.
By way of exclusion, all parties in only quasi-criminal proceedings who
have occasion to invoke this boon to the way-ward will be slighted. Any
party to a civil suit invoking a doctrine resembling entrapment will be
summarily ignored. Thus are excluded public officers or private employees
with the poor taste to claim entrapment in a discharge or disciplinary pro-
ceeding based on allegedly entrapped misconduct. Similarly, any question
of the critxinality of entrapping conduct, i.e. the guilt of the entrapping
agent, will be excluded from consideration.4 Moreover all cases involving
lack of a factual element essential to guilt are to be distinguished from true
entrapment situations. Professor Perkins points out that many so-called
entrapment cases can be explained as failure to commit a crime due to
over-zealousness of the entrapper.' Typical of this error is the consent of a
decoy victim to a crime requiring lack of consent, such as larceny or bur-
glary,6 and the supplying of a "fence" with property once stolen but which
has lost its contraband character.7 Having established just how narrow the
inquiry will be, we now proceed.
II
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE
Historically, entrapment must be described as a purely American anomaly,
and a recent one. Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century courts,
both English and American, felt themselves governed by 3 Genesis 13,
wherein Eve, under indictment for consumption of fruit from the Tree
of Good and Evil (possibly some crude form of early Pure Food and Drug
Law), offered as a defense the temptation to which she had been subjected
by the Serpent.8 It was held, as a matter of law, that the pleaded matter
3 Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, 60 YALE L. J. 1091, 1098 (1951).
4 A discussion of this matter can be found in Annot. 120 A.L.R. 1506 (1939), Criminal Re-
sponsibility of one who acts as decoy to detect commission of crime.
5 PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW, Chap. 10, §9, p. 921-922 (1957).
6 For a good collection of older cases on this point see Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S.
435, 442 (1932). Later decisions may be found in 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law, §45(6) (1961).
7 People v. Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906). People v. Zimmerman, 11 Cal.App. 115,
104 Pac. 590 (1909).
8 "Then the Lord God said to the woman, 'What is this that you have done?' The woman
said, 'The serpent beguiled me, and I ate.'" Genesis 3:13, HOLY BIBLE (Rev. Stan. ed. 1952).
[Vol. I
ENTRAPMENT AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE
constituted no defense to criminal responsibility. This attitude prevailed
in the United States until late in the nineteenth century, the concept of
entrapment being considered simply irrelevant to questions of guilt or
innocence. In an 1864 liquor violation case, Board of Commissioners v.
Backus, the New York Supreme Court first uttered the now hackneyed
Eve analogy, and said regarding her plea:
That defense was overruled by the great Lawgiver, and whatever esti-
mate we may form, or whatever judgment pass upon the character or
conduct of the tempter, this plea has never since availed to shield crime
or give indemnity to the culprit, and it is safe to say that under any
court of civilized, not to say Christian ethics, it never will.9
When again a New York court had occasion to discuss the defense, raised
this time in a prosecution for theft of public records, it there held:
We are asked to protect the defendant, not because he is innocent, but
because a zealous public officer exceeded his powers and held out a bait.
The courts do not look to see who held out the bait, but to see who took
it.'0
And though this negative attitude toward the defense of entrapment no
longer prevails in American courts it is still the rule in Great Britain. In
that jurisdiction the defense has been regularly ignored, going completely
unrecognized by the earlier authorities and being treated harshly by the
modern writers and in the case law. No mention, either favorable, or un-
favorable can be found in Hale," East,' 2 Hawkins," Russell,'4 or Stephen. 5
A. The English Approach
English precedent on the subject is quite limited. Norden's case in
1774 held it no defense to a robbery prosecution that the victim went
armed in hopes of being robbed, and after completion of the crime arrested
the highwayman. 6 But where several persons procured others to rob one
of their number, and the remainder of the conspirators then arrested the
robbers for the reward, no crime of robbery was held to have been corn-
9 29 How.Pr. 33, 42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1864) involved a violation induced by detectives hired
by the licensing board. The court rejected the defense that the liquor commissioners were
particeps criminis and therefore unable to recover on the bond, and also negatived any excuse
of entrapment by citation of its biblical authority.
10 People v. Mills, 178 N.Y. 274, 289, 70 N.E. 786, 791 (1904).
1 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1716, 1778, 1847 eds.).
12 EAST, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1803).
1 HAWKINS, A SUMMARY OF THE CROWN LAW (1728); A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE
CROWN (1788).
14 RUSSELL, A TREATIESE OF CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS (1819, 1910 eds.).
1 5 STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1863); A HISTORY OF
THE CaMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883).
16 Norden's Case, Fost.Crim.Cas. 129 (1774).
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mitted.' 7 On the other hand an indictment for disposing of forged bank
notes was held proper notwithstanding the person to whom they were
uttered was an agent of the involved bank and purchased them for pur-
poses of detection and prosecution. 8 And larceny was found to exist even
though the coins stolen had been left unprotected by a servant pretending
to cooperate with the thief but in fact acting under the owner's directions. 9
In 1848 a situation arose in which factual entrapment was involved, though
the point decided was the applicability of the accomplice testimony rule to
evidence given by the entrapping agent." Holding such corroboration to
be unnecessary, the charge to the jury stated:
The government are, no doubt, justified in employing spies; and I do
not see that a person so employed deserves to be blamed if he instigates
offences no further than pretending to concur with the perpetrators. 21
Basically then, it can be inferred that a permissive attitude toward use of
decoys prevailed, as shown in 1880 by R. v. Thomas Titley,22 wherein
admitted solicitation of an abortionist by a plainclothes detective was not
even considered as a defense. Shortly after Titley the Scottish case of
Blaikie v. Linton,2 an illegal liquor sale, brought acquittal because the
officer was found to have induced a crime which would never have oc-
curred but for his solicitation. Though the cases of the period reflect it
poorly, this was a time of frequent comment and interest by the British
bar in the entrapment problem, with criticism of police practices and praise
of the Blaikie decision appearing in the lawyers' journals of that day.24
However this generally unfavorable attitude toward police use of entrap-
ment tactics had little effect on the success of an entrapment in the courts.
Bickley's 25 case held requests to purchase an abortifacient did not invoke
the accomplice testimony rule against the police decoy. Though the facts
show misrepresentation and inducement by the agent entrapment is not
even considered a defense. In Brannon v. Peak,26 conviction for violation
of the Street Betting Act was reversed on other grounds, nothing being
17 R. v. Macdaniel, 168 Eng.Rep. 124 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1754).
18 R. v. Holden, 127 EngRep. 1107 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1810).
19 R. v. Williams, 174 Eng.Rep. 772 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1843).
20 For the relationship of this accomplice testimony rule to the entrapment problem see
Annot. 119 A.L.R. 689 (1939).
21 R. v. Mullins, 3 Cox Crim.Cas. 526; 12 J.P. 776 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1848).
22 14 Cox Crim.Cas. 502 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1880).
23 18 Scot.Law Rep. 583 (1880).
24 15 Irish Law Times 395, 410, 494, 583 (1881) 71 London Law Times 223 (1881); 1
Canadian Law Times 542 (1881).
25 R. v. Bickley, 2 Crim.App.R. 53, 73 J.P. 239 (C.C.A. 1909).
26 (1947) 2 All.E.R. 572 (Q.B.).
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said of the effect of the officer having suggested and requested that his bet
be taken by the defendant. And Browning v. J. W. H. Watson (Rotches-
ter), Ltd.27 upholds conviction under circumstances that might tempt any
court to allow, or if necessary, create a defense of entrapment. In that case,
as summarized by Glanville Williams:
The use of a motor-coach by the defendants for the conveyance of mem-
bers of a club would have been lawful but for the presence of two non-members who were in the employment of the licensing authority and
who joined the party as "snoopers," without the knowledge of the de-
fendants. The defendants were convicted of an offense solely because ofthe presence of the snoopers. It can only be said that this discreditableconclusion was arrived at on the basis of absolute responsibility ... 28
The refusal to allow a defense of entrapment herein indicates that English
courts are still not sympathetic toward the concept, no matter how deserv-
ing the circumstances.
According to Williams, this hostile attitude is largely due to the belief
that there is no legal justification for upholding such defense.29 The legal
bases on which American courts have rested the defense is a question to
which we shall return in Part II-B below, but for the moment it is suffi-
cient to note the British opinion that entrapment can be no excuse to
criminal responsibility.
B. The American Authorities.
American authorities similarly ignored the possibility of entrapment
constituting a defense until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The
topic "entrapment," or any of its synonymous manifestations of "agent
provacateur," or "official instigation of crime" cannot be found in any
American test until 1880, when the 8th edition of Wharton's stated that
entrapment constituted no defense." By his 10th edition in 1896 Wharton
recognized the defense on the basis of an estoppel: ". . . the government is
precluded from asking that the offenders thus decoyed should be con-
victed. They are associated with the government in the commission of the
crime, and the offense being joint, the prosecution must fail." 3 Bishop,
the other leading American text writer, did not recognize the defense in his
work until 1923.32 A good survey of the early authorities appears in
27 (1953) 2 AII.E.R. 775 (Q.B.).
28 G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART, §256, p. 784 (2nd ed. 1961).
29 1d. at 785.
30 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW, 142 (8th ed. 1880).
31 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW, 166 (10th ed. 1896).
32 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW, §926 (9th ed. 1923).
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Mikell's often cited article, Entrapment in the Federal Courts.3 In the
United States, the concept of entrapment as a defense seems to have origi-
nated with the state courts. In 1878 the case of Michigan v. Saunders34
reversed a conviction for burglary in which evidence of entrapment had
been excluded, a concurring justice taking the occasion to state a strong
policy against conviction when entrapment had been employed by the
government.
If we cannot assist another and prevent him from violating the laws of
the land, we at least should abstain from any active efforts in the way
of leading him into temptation. Desire to commit crime and opportuni-
ties for the commission thereof would seem sufficiently general and
numerous, and no special efforts would seem necessary in the way of
encouragement or assistance in that direction. 5
In 1879, Texas held a prosecution for bribery of a jailor not within the
spirit of the prohibiting Criminal Code section when "the officer first sug-
gests his willingness to a person to accept a bribe to release a prisoner in
his charge, and thereby originates the criminal intent..." 31 Within twenty
years the defense was common in state prosecutions.37
This general acceptance by the state courts was gradually reflected in
the federal system. In fact, virtually all the law on entrapment since the
Sorrells decision in 1932 has been made in the federal courts and adopted
by the states.3"
Federal Cases
The first federal case to consider the doctrine is usually said to be
United States v. Whittier in 1878, a nonmailable matter case, (in which
entrapment was not strictly applicable, the solicitation being done by an
agent of the Society for the Suppression of Vice rather than by a' govern-
ment agent) wherein replying to a decoy letter was held not to be the
giving of information within the statutory prohibition. A concurring
opinion collaterally discussed the entrapment issue, and while admitting
it to be no defense to criminal responsibility nevertheless suggested that
"No court should, even to aid in detecting a supposed offender, lend its
countenance to a violation of positive law, or to contrivances for inducing
a person to commit a crime." 9 In 1894 United States v. Adams40 held no
33 90 U. PA. L. REv. 245 (1942).
3438 Mich. 218 (1878).
35 Id. at 222.
36 O'Brien v. State, 6 Tex.Cr.App. 665, 668 (1879).
37 1 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 24, at 166; note 25 L.R.A. 341-47 (1894).
3 8 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
39 28 Fed.Cas. 591, 594 (#16,688) (E.D. Mo. 1878).
40 59 Fed. 674 (D. Ore. 1894).
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conviction could stand in an entrapment situation wherein decoy letters
and personal visits overcame the reluctance of a seller of contraceptive
devices, even though the vendor had advertised her product in magazines
and her reluctance was due solely to a desire to confine sales to married
persons, which while morally commendable was legally immaterial. Adams
cited as authority for its novel holding the concurring opinion in Whittier
and the state case of Michigan v. Saunders. Finally, in 1915 an entrapment
case reached the circuit court level, and its favorable reception there
marked the beginning of widespread judicial acceptance of the new con-
cept in the federal system. This clear recognition of the defense, and a
square holding based thereon by a Federal appellate court, appeared in
Woo Wai v. United States41 in 1915, roughly thirty-five years after state
courts began to admit the plea. Citing a number of state cases as authority
for the concept,42 Woo Wai held a defendant entitled to acquittal as a re-
sult of strong persuasion and repeated solicitation used to overcome his
resistance to commit the offense charged. The somewhat complicated facts
were as follows: the United States Immigration Commission suspected
certain immigration officers of allowing illegal importation of Chinese. Be-
lieving Woo Wai to have connections with said officers, the Commission,
by means of an undercover agent, convinced him to propose illegal impor-
tation to certain honest immigration officials, who arrested him for con-
spiracy to bribe and used the threat of prosecution to gain all information
possessed by Woo Wai concerning the suspected officers. Under these
circumstances it is little wonder the conviction was reversed. The basis of
the defense was said to be "that a sound public policy can be upheld only
by denying the criminality of those who are thus induced to commit acts
which infringe the letter of the criminal statutes." 4 3 After Woo Wai the
defense was quickly accepted by the lower federal courts, particularly after
the onset of Prohibition.44
41 223 Fed. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
42 Six cases are cited, all of which speak disapprovingly of the entrapment of persons into
crime. All are state cases, reflecting the earlier observation that the defense developed orig-
inally in the state courts and filtered through to the federal system.
Love v. People, 160 Ill. 501, 43 N.W. 710 (1896).
People v. McCord, 76 Mich. 200, 42 N.W. 1106 (1889).
Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 218 (1878).
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 42 Pa.Super. 38 (1910).
Commonwealth v. Bickings, 12 Pa.Dist. 206 (1903).
O'Brien v. State, 6 Tex.Cr.App. 665 (1879).4 3 Woo Wai v. United States, supra note 41 at 415.
44 Early federal cases are collected in Annot. 18 A.L.R. 146 (1922) ; Annot. 66 A.L.R. 478
(1930) ; Annot. 86 A.L.R. 263 (1933) ; O'Brien v. United States, 51 F.2d 678, note 1 (7th Cir.
1931); and Note 41 YALE L. J. (1932); 2 So. CAL. L. REv. 283 (1929); 78 CoLum. L. REv.
1067 (1928).
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Probably the last judicial criticism of the basic entrapment doctrine
itself was voiced in the 1927 case of United States v. Washington45 wherein
Judge Woodrough stated that the defense, "being based on no statute and
developed without sanction or encouragement by the Supreme Court the
most this court can do is to declare how the doctrine will be applied in the
instant case... I adhere to my opinion that the general question is politi-
cal and not judicial." 46 However this conservative approach to recognition
of the new defense was already outmoded when the Washington case was
decided, as Judge Woodrough realized in his reluctant application of the
defense, though his criticism was vainly echoed by Mikell's 1942 article."
The United States Supreme Court had been slow to recognize the new
defense, but even that was to change by the early 1930's. The career of
entrapment in the Supreme Court reflects its comparatively late develop-
ment and yet widespread acceptance in American courts, all within the
span of fifty years. The cause of this phenomenon was basically the nature
of the crimes in which entrapment practices are used by the police.
America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed the
coming of Comstockery, the Mann Act, The Harrison Drug Act, Prohibi-
tion and sumptuary legislation generally to a degree unheard of at common
law. Great Britain, on the other hand, has not gone so far as to outlaw
prostitution per se, considered in America to be one of the most objection-
able of the vice crimes .4 But in almost every American jurisdiction state
or federal laws, or municipal ordinances prohibit such of life's simpler
pleasures as the practice of prostitution, frequenting its practitioners,
gambling, homosexual acts, sale or purchase of intoxicants to some de-
gree, and unauthorized use, transfer or possession of narcotics.
The significance of all these new crimes is their inadaptibility to a
prosecutory scheme based on private complaint. These welfare offenses, no
longer based on force, fraud or stealth call forth no ready complainant, as
all involved are willing participants and cannot be expected to complain.
Consequently the creation of these new offenses brought unaccustomed dif-
ficulties of enforcement in the attempt to discover the existence of criminal
activity and to gather evidence of same. Viewed in historical perspective,
the whole problem of entrapment has stemmed from a judicial reaction to
45 20 F.2d 160 (D. Neb. 1927).
4 6 Id. at 161.
47 9 U. PA. L. REv. 245 (1942).
48 Home Office, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION,
1957 (Wolfenden Report). British narcotics laws are far more permissive than United States
Regulation. Lindesmith, The British System of Narcotics Control, 22 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PROB. 138 (1957) ; Schur, British Narcotics Policies, 51 J. CRim. L., C. & P. S. 619 (1961).
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the means used by police to achieve presence at such illegal transactions,
either in person or through the agency of informers. 49
In 1928, Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote a powerful dissent, calling for ac-
ceptance of the doctrine of entrapment:
The prosecution should be stopped, not because some right (of the de-
fendant) has been denied, but in order to protect the Government. To
protect it from illegal conduct of its officers. To preserve the purity of
its courts.50
The germ of this dissent, acting upon the accumulated experience of the
Court regarding past prosecution, and particularly with abuses under the
unpopular National Prohibition Act (an archtypical consensual crime)
produced the result in Sorrells v. United States. 1 A prohibition agent
visited the home of Sorrells with other friends of the defendant. After
introduction and conversation the agent asked to purchase illegal whiskey,
which Sorrells refused to supply. Further conversation established the
agent and Sorrells to have served in the same division in World War I,
the sheer nostalgia of which induced Sorrells to procure the prohibited
intoxicants. When indicted and tried for illegal possession and sale of
liquor in violation of the prohibition laws the defendant requested an in-
struction allowing the jury to find entrapment on the aforementioned facts.
The refusal of the instruction constituted grounds for reversal in the Su-
preme Court. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the majority reversed
and remanded, stating:
We are of the opinion that upon the evidence produced in the instant
case the defense of entrapment was available and the trial court was in
error in holding that as a matter of law there was no entrapment, and in
refusing to submit the issue to the jury.52
The rationale of this majority opinion was that of statutory construction,
determining that Congress, in enacting the National Prohibition Act had
no intent to prohibit sales instigated by prohibition agents for the purpose
of luring an otherwise innocent person into crime and prosecuting him for
such a governmentally induced violation. This acceptance by the Supreme
Court of the defense signaled its complete amalgamation into the modern
. The United States Supreme Court has recently permitted wide latitude to law enforce-
ment officers in their use of these techniques. See Hoffa v. United States ....... U.S ....... , 87
S.Ct. 408 (1966); Lewis v. United States, . U.S ....... , 87 S.Ct. 424 (1966); Osborn v.
United States,. ..... U.S ....... 87 S. Ct. 429 (1966).
50 Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 425 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
51287 U.S. 435 (1932).
52 Id. at 452.
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common law of crimes. In 1958 Sherman v. United States,5" and Masciale
v. United States54 approved the Sorrells decision and reasoning. The cur-
rent status of the doctrine would appear to be unchanged.55
In summary entrapment is recognized as a defense in most fifty Amer-
ican states.56 The Supreme Court has affirmed its acceptance of the doc-
trine, and the lower federal courts regularly encounter and admit the plea.
Leading text writers and case book authors discuss entrapment at length
with ample case documentation,5 7 and the number of cases turning on the
entrapment questions grows steadily. Thus, the concept of entrapment is
today a well recognized and regularly employed defense. But, as will be
seen, this general acceptance has not brought uniformity of opinion as to
treatment of the pleading and practice aspects of the defense.
III
DOCTRINAL BASES OF THE ENTRAPMENT CONCEPT
The early authorities which discussed entrapment as a defense made little
nonsense about theory. The concept was simply described as a strong
public policy against what were considered unnecessary and therefore
unjust prosecutions.
Human nature is frail enough at best, and requires no encouragement
in wrongdoing. If we cannot assist another and prevent him from violat-
ing the laws of the land, we at least should abstain from any active
efforts in the way of leading him into temptation.5 8
53 356 U.S. 369 (1958), wherein an informer became acquainted with defendant in a doc-
tor's office where both were ostensibly undergoing treatment for their addiction. Sherman was
repeatedly solicited by the informer to procure additional narcotics to relieve his alleged suf-
fering from the withdrawal process. Sherman yielded only after many requests and great
persuasion, and despite the jury's rejection of an entrapment defense the United States Su-
preme Court reversed and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the indictment, its
finding being that entrapment existed as a matter of law.
54356 U.S. 386 (1958), wherein defendant was introduced to a narcotics agent by a third
party who was acting as an informer for the Bureau of Narcotics. Masciale testified that he
was only trying to help the third party impress the supposed narcotics buyer, but that by
promises of easy money and persistent solicitation, the third party eventually induced the de-
fendant to supply narcotics to the government agent. The conviction was affirmed, entrapment
not existing as a matter of law and the jury having been properly instructed on the issue.
55 Cf. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) and Lewis v. United States, ...... U.S.
....... 87 S.Ct  424, 426 (1966) (footnote 3 of the Court's opinion). Lopez and Lewis both con-
cerned the use of government agents who "pretended to play along with" suspects who had
attempted to bribe and sell narcotics (respectively). The Supreme Court was more concerned
with electronic eavesdropping considerations than entrapment, but affirmed both convictions.
56 See, for example, the cases cited in footnote 42, supra.
57 PERKINS, CRIINAL LAW, p. 921 et. seq. (1957). CLARK & MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CRIMES, §5:13 (6th ed. Wingersky rev. 1958). INBAU & SOWLE, CASES AND COM-
MENTS ON CarMINAL JUSTICE, Chap. 8 §6, p. 687 (1960).
58 People v. Saunders, 38 Mich. 218, 222 (1878).
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... it is unconscionable, contrary to public policy, and to the law of theland to punish a man for the commission of an offense of the like ofwhich he... evidently never would have been guilty of if the officers
of the law had not inspired, incited, persuaded and lured him to attempt
to commit it.59
... a sound public policy can be upheld only by denying the criminality
of those who are thus induced to commit acts which infringe the letter
of criminal statutes.60
It must be conceded that it would be violative of sound public policy
and repugnant to good morals to uphold the conviction of a person who,
being entirely innocent of any intention to commit a crime, was in-
veigled into its commission by an officer of the law... 61
Inevitably legal primitivism yielded to the demands of a precedent system
for a clearly defined doctrine offering uniformity of application and pre-
dictibility of result. Numerous theories have been advanced from time to
time as being able to furnish such uniformity, but none has yet won gen-
eral acceptance.
Proceeding chronologically, the original basis of public policy was so
vague as to be useless in determining questions arising in the defense's
application and in forecasting results in novel situations. Policy explana-
tions, like interstate carriers, may not discriminate in what they carry,
and thus can be invoked in support of any number of conflicting ap-
proaches to pleading and evidence problems. These of course are the real
focal points of all this theoretical controversy, and here public policy offers
no guides or solutions to such mundane problems as what constitutes
proper rebuttal evidence or how the defense should be raised. Moreover
the phrase "public policy" may explain why an entrapment defense is de-
sirable, but it does not allow the plea. This was the difficulty raised by the
landmark majority opinion in Sorrells.62 Chief Justice Hughes reasoned
that the Supreme Court lacked authority to create a hitherto unrecog-
nized excuse to criminal responsibility,s though it did uphold the defense
on grounds of statutory construction. The majority felt that to simply
acquit or dismiss the indictment even though the defendant had committed
the alleged acts would be equivalent to an act of judicial clemency, a prac-
59 Butts v. United States, 273 Fed. 35, 38 (8th Cir. 1921).6 0 Woo Wai v. United States, 223 Fed. 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1915).
61 Ex parte Moore, 70 Cal.App. 483, 487; 233 Pac. 805, 806 (1924).
62 Sorrells v. United States, supra note 51.
63 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) existed as authority for exclusion of il-
legally obtained evidence, but that decision proceeded under inherent judicial power over ad-
missibility of evidence. Entrapment however involves an acquittal even though accused
committed the proscribed acts, with no admissibility question involved. Also the McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) and Mallory v. United States 354 U.S. 449 (1957) cases
were still in the future, and no broad "civilized standards" rule existed to justify creation of
a new defense.
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tice specifically forbidden by Ex Parte United States.64 There the Court
denied the power of lower federal courts to suspend indefinitely sentences
specifically provided for a crime, no matter how humane the reasons for
such suspension:
... since its exercise in the very nature of things amounts to a refusal
by the judicial power to perform a duty resting upon it and, as a conse-
quence thereof, to an interference with both the legislative and execu-
tive authority as fixed by the Constitution. 65
Hughes and the other members of the majority regarded a mere humane
public policy to be similarly untenable as an explanation of the entrapment
defense, holding:
We are unable to approve the view that the court, although treating the
statute as applicable despite the entrapment, and the defendant as
guilty, has authority to grant immunity, or to adopt a procedure to that
end. It is the function of the court to construe the statute, not to de-
feat it as construed. Clemency is the function of the Executive.66
Where defendant has been duly indicted for an offense found to be
within the statute, and the proper authorities seek to proceed with the
prosecution, the court cannot refuse to try the case in the constitutional
method because it desires to let the defendant go free.67
Public policy explanations thus were not only vague in application but
failed to clear the hurdle of lack of authority, considered by Glanville
Williams as the major reason England rejects the defense.'
The first doctrinal tool proposed to replace the policy explanation was
that of an estoppel, i.e., the basis for entrapment is found in an estoppel
worked against the government on the ground it caused and created the
crime for which it prosecutes.69 The concept developed from a cautious
combination of public policy and estoppel in United States v. Healy"°
wherein a conviction by means of entrapment was said to be "unjust and
contrary to public policy" because the government's invitation was "of
the nature of fraudulent concealment and deceit, and if not consent, yet
doth work an estoppel. Though the defendant has violated the statute, he
was the passive instrument of the government, and his is a blameless
wrong for which he cannot be justly convicted." 71 Another court likened
64 242 U.S. 27 (1916).
65 Id. at 51.
66 Sorrells v. United States, supra note 51 at 449.
67 Id. at 450.
68 G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART, §256, p. 784 (2nd ed. 1961).
69 United States v. Lynch, 256 Fed. 983, 984 (S.D. N.Y. 1918).
70 202 Fed. 349 (D. Mont. 1913).
71 Id. at 350.
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the situation to that in a civil suit between individuals wherein one insti-
gating damage to his own interests would be precluded from suing the
person induced to commit the injury.72 This view was upheld as late as
1943, when the Seventh Circuit ruled "The defense of entrapment is a con-
cession that the crime has been committed, but the law invokes an estoppel
against the government because of the conduct of its officers.73 Moreover,
Professor Perkins in his text on criminal law still maintains that "the
true theory of the defense of entrapment is that of estoppel." 7' However
this estoppel doctrine has several grave defects, for as Glanville Williams
points out, the doctrine has never been recognized in the criminal law, no
estoppel being possible against a prosecuting sovereign. 75
Next in order of appearance came an explanation of entrapment as a
function of judicial integrity protecting the purity of judicial processes.
The feelings of many judges were expressed by Mr. Justice Brandeis in
his important Casey dissent:
This prosecution should be stopped, not because some right of Casey's
has been denied, but in order to protect the Government. To protect it
from illegal conduct of its officers. To preserve the purity of its courts.76
It was this view urged by Justice Roberts in the separate opinion in Sor-
rells:
The protection of its own functions and the preservation of the purity of
its own temple belongs only to the court. It is the province of the court
and of the court alone to protect itself and the government from such
prostitution of the criminal law.7 7
Though well argued, this judicial integrity explanation did not prevail in
Sorrells. Advocated by the majority as its rationale was the premise that
Congress, in enacting the National Prohibition Act, did not intend to pro-
hibit sales instigated by prohibition agents for the purpose of luring an
otherwise innocent person into crime and prosecuting him for such a gov-
ernmentally induced violation.78 Theoretically speaking, this view explains
the defense as a lack of actus reus, i.e. that the act done by defendant was
not criminal because the legislature intended governmentally instigated
acts to be excepted from the general statutory prohibition.
7 2 Voves v. United States, 249 Fed. 191 (7th Cir. 1918).
73 United States v. Kaiser, 138 F.2d 219 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. den. 320 U.S. 801 (1944).7 4 PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW, Chap. 10, §9, p. 925 (1957).
75 WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 71 at 785.
76 Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 425 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
77 Sorrells v. United States, supra note 51 at 456.
78 Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, 60 YALE L. J. 1091, 1101 (1951) presents a
good account of the reasoning used to achieve this conclusion.
April 1967]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
Mr. Justice Roberts in his concurring opinion was severly critical of
this majority attempt as "a new method of rationalizing the defense""
which obscured entrapment's true nature as an implementation of the old
public policy theory, justified as a judicial refusal to participate in palpable
injustice. Seen by Roberts as the major faults of the majority rationale
were its hypocrisy in naming this purely judicial offspring after some sus-
pected legislative intent,"° and its inadequacy to control the pleading and
proof of the defense in the way he thought necessary."' Recalling the his-
torical development of the entrapment defense by the courts without
precedent or legislative encouragement, the hypocrisy criticism commands
some agreement. It may also be pointed out that this lack of actus reus
theory, because of supposed legislative intent, is workable only in the fed-
eral system, wherein all crimes must be of statutory origin.82 Regarding
common law crimes no legislative intent can be posited, and any explana-
tion must admit the defense to be a judicial creation, contrary to Hughes'
theory.
Since Sorrells in 1932, little drastically different has been offered in the
way of theoretical justification for the defense. The commentators have
very markedly favored Roberts' judicial integrity explanation and criti-
cized the majority reasoning.83 Federal and state cases have simply per-
mitted the defense without analysis of its foundation. And though the
Sorrells majority spoke in terms of determining statutory intent on a case
by case basis,84 the lower courts have again and again relied on Sorrells in
allowing entrapment as a defense to other statutory crimes without any
discussion of the particular legislative intent involved.85
Despite scholarly criticism and failure of the lower courts to follow
its reasoning, the Sorrells majority explanation was seemingly approved in
the only two cases involving entrapment to be decided by the Supreme
79 Sorrells v. United States, supra note 51 at 459.
80 Id. at 456. "This amounts to saying that one who with full intent commits the act de-
fined by law as an offense is nevertheless by virtue of the unspoken and implied mandate of
the statute to be adjudged not guilty by reason of someone else's improper conduct. It is merely
to adopt a form of words to justify which ought to be based on the inherent right of the court
not to be made the instrument of wrong."
81 See Part IV below in regard to pleading and evidence problems and Robert's pronounced
views in those matters.
82 United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812), United States v.
Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816).
83 Donnelly, supra note 78, 33 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033 (1958); 28 FOREDHAM L. REy. 339
(1959) ; 73 HARV. L. REV. 1334 (1960).
84 Sorrells v. United States, supra note 51 at 451.
8533 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033, 1037 note 32 (1958); Donnelly, supra note 81 at 1110; Miekl,
The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 259 (1942).
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Court since 1932. Sherman v. United States 6 and Masciale v. United
States," both narcotics violations, were heard in 1958 and in both cases
the Sorrells majority was approved. However the language of Chief Jus-
tice Warren in Sherman that "Congress could not have intended that its
statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into viola-
tions,"88 as opposed to the Sorrells position "We have no occasion to con-
sider hypothetical cases of crimes so heinous or revolting that the appli-
cable law would admit of no exceptions," 8 9 indicates the legislative intent
is no longer presumed to apply only to particular statutes but rather to
criminal legislation generally, a position very near to the old public policy
explanation, save for blaming that policy on the legislature rather than the
courts.
Once again, in Sherman as in Sorrells, a strong minority9" spoke for the
judicial integrity basis. This time the spokesman was Justice Frankfurter,
and his statement that:
The courts refuse to convict an entrapped defendant, not because his
conduct falls outside the proscription of the statute, but because, even
if his guilt be admitted, the methods employed on behalf of the Govern-
ment to bring about conviction cannot be countenanced. 91
Though not presenting any radically new justifications for the defense,
Frankfurter's opinion does express a changed orientation of the judicial
integrity theory. Mr. Justice Brandeis in Casey and Mr. Justice Roberts
in Sorrells spoke of the court's reaction to entrapment as defensive in
nature, designed to prevent use of the courts as instruments of injustice.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter on the other hand speaks of disciplining the police
and using the defense as a means of improving police procedures, of frus-
trating those methods employed on behalf of the government which can-
not be countenanced. This difference of emphasis is immaterial within the
federal system, as the Supreme Court under the "civilized standards"
rule92 can apply its minimum standards of judicial integrity to all inferior
federal courts, whether those minimums be seen as passively preserving
judicial dignity or actively improving police administration. However
judicial integrity in Mr. Justice Roberts' version would not justify exten-
86356 U.S. 369 (1958).
87356 U.S. 386 (1958).
88 Sherman v. United States, supra note 86 at 372.
89 Supra note 51 at 451.
90 Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, Harlan and Brennan in Sherman; Justices Roberts, Bran-
deis and Stone in Sorrells.
91 Supra note 86 at 380.
9 2 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
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sion of Supreme Court standards regarding entrapment to a case coming
from the state courts, or justify their retention in federal cases should
Congress limit or restrict the defense in particular crimes. For the Supreme
Court to enforce recognition of the defense in such cases would require a
conversion into due process. And indeed as long ago as 1921 the case of
Butta v. United States used language strongly reminiscent of due process
in its historical sense of per legem terrae:
It is unconscionable, contrary to public policy, and to the law of the
land to punish a man for an offense the. like of which he ... evidently
never would have been guilty of if the officers of the law had not in-
spired, persuaded, and lured him to attempt to commit it.93
Such a constitutional transition would be simple indeed under Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's view in the Sherman case that:
A statute prohibiting the sale of narcotics is as silent on the question
of entrapment as it is on the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence.
It is enacted, however, on the basis of certain presuppositions concern-
ing the established legal order and the role of the courts within that
system in formulating standards for the administration of criminal jus-
tice when Congress itself has not specifically legislated to that end. Spe-
cific statutes are to be fitted into an antecedent legal system.'
Similarly one of the leading state cases on entrapment, People v. Ben ford, 5
clearly states that the entrapment defense rests upon the same considera-
tions of a court's regard for its own dignity as an agency of justice as does
the exclusionary rule. Of course since Mapp v. Ohio9" we know the exclu-
sionary rule to be due process, which would lead a suspicious mind to infer
that freedom from entrapment may possibly bloom into due process also
should a case with sufficiently sordid facts arise to offend the judicial con-
science. At least one federal case has stated conviction by entrapment
would violate due process, and one commentator has urged this constitu-
tional basis as "the surer ground" on which to base the defense.97
To recapitulate, the proferred explanations have come to a full circle.
Starting with an unsophisticated denunciation of entrapment as against
basic public policy, the explanations have traveled through estoppel, lack
of actus reus, and now back to public policy, this time of the sophisticated"civilized standards" type, which vaguely threatens to crystallize into a
93 273 Fed. 35, 38 (8th Cir. 1921).
94 Supra note 86 at 381.
95 345 P.2d 928, 937 (Cal. 1959).
96367 U.S. 643 (1961).
97 Comment, The Entrapment Doctrine in the Federal Courts, and Some State Court Com-
parisons, 49 J.C.L., C. & P. S. 447 (1959).
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constitutional necessity through due process. But no theory commands
sufficient acceptance to have determined the practical controversies over
pleading and evidence, which must consequently now be dealt with.
IV
PROBLEMS IN TRIAL ADMINISTRATION
A. Tests of Entrapment
Having seen something of the development and theory of the entrap-
ment defense, it is now necessary to consider its application. In applying
any defense some verbal formula is needed to serve as the test or instruc-
tion by which judge or jury determines existence of the defense. For many
years the primary tests used to implement the entrapment defense were
simply restatements in lay language of Justice Roberts' definition of en-
trapment as "the conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and
his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated
it except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer." 98
Expressions most often used to convey this concept have been the
"origin of intent" and "creative activity" tests. The origin of intent for-
mulation is traceable to O'Brien v. State wherein it was held no crime "if
the officer first suggests his willingness to a person to accept a bribe to
release a prisoner in his charge, and thereby originates the criminal in-
tent.. ." 11 This characterization of the test of entrapment was approved
and adopted in Woo Wai,10 the first federal appellate decision accepting
the defense, and has been used frequently since.'' When instructing on
this test trial judges ordinarily explain that the question for the jury is
whether the defendant was predisposed to commit crimes of the general
nature of that into which he was entrapped, for obviously the particular
intent to initiate the specific illegal transaction originated with the entrap-
ping officers."0 2
The creative activity criterion is of uncertain origin. Its modern popu-
larity derives directly from its use by Chief Justice Hughes in the Sor-
rells opinion:
98 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932) (concurring opinion).
99 6 Tex.Crim.App. 665, 668 (1879).
100 223 Fed. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
101 Jones v. State, 101 Ga.App. 851, 115 S.E.2d 576 (1960); Riddle v. State, 373 P.2d 832
(Okl. Cr. 1962), 374 P.2d 634 (Okl. Cr. 1962) ; Sutton v. State, 170 Tex.Cr.R. 617, 343 S.W.2d
452 (1959). See also Am. JuR. Crim. Law §335 (1938).
102 United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1009 (2d Cir. 1933), 28 CoLuM. L. REV. 1067,
1069 (1928).
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. . . the controlling question (is) whether the defendant is a person
otherwise innocent whom the Government is seeking to punish for an
alleged offense which is the product of the creative activity of its own
officials.' 03
However the true origin may antedate Sorrells, as indicated by the lan-
guage of Butts v. United States, decided eleven years earlier:
The first duties of the officers of the law are to prevent, not to punish
crime. It is not their duty to incite and create crime for the sole purpose
of prosecuting and punishing it... (I)t is unconscionable, contrary to
public policy, and to the established law of the land to punish a man
for an offense the like of which he had never been guilty, either in
thought or in deed, and evidently never would have been guilty of if
the officers of the law had not inspired, incited, persuaded, and lured
him to attempt to commit it.10 4
Sherman affirmed the use of this creative activity test 0 5 and today much
of the discussion of entrapment is phrased in terms of creative activity. °6
At the trial level these standard formulations of origin of intent and
creative activity are often combined in such instructions as the one com-
mon in California courts.
The law does not tolerate a person, particularly a law enforcement officer,
generating in the mind of a person who is innocent of any criminal pur-
pose, the original intent to commit a crime thus entrapping such person
into the commission of a crime which he would not have committed or
even contemplated but for such inducement; and where a crime is com-
mitted as a consequence of such entrapment, no conviction may be had
of the person so entrapped as his acts do not constitute a crime.
If the intent to commit the crime did not originate with the defendant
and he was not carrying out his own criminal purpose, but the crime
was suggested by another person acting with the purpose of entrapping
and causing the arrest of the defendant, then the defendant is not crim-
inally liable for the acts so committed.' 0 7
Both of these formulations, as well as Roberts' classic definition, express
a subjective element which must be found by the jury if it is to acquit for
entrapment, i.e. the state of mind or prior disposition of the defendant is
the determining factor. "To determine whether entrapment has been estab-
lished, a line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and
the trap for the unwary criminal." "' That is the significance of the often
repeated statement that what is forbidden is not furnishing of opportunity
103 Supra note 98 at 451.
104 273 Fed. 35, 38 (8th Cir. 1921).
105 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
10622 C.J.S. Criminal Law §45 (1), (2).
107 People v. Finkelstin, 98 Cal.App.2d 545, 550, 220 P.2d 934, 941 (1950).
108 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
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but creation of the criminal disposition, which is the necessary subjective
element distinguishing the innocent from the criminal individual. This is
analyzed psychiatrically by Professor Donnelly as a means of discriminat-
ing between chronic and situational offenders, between an antisocial indi-
vidual and a weakling. To accomplish this discrimination a great deal of
evidence has traditionally been admitted in rebuttal of entrapment which
would be admissible neither as substantive evidence nor in impeachment,
e.g. arrests without conviction and criminal reputation. °9 Such evidence is
however material to the issue of defendant's prior disposition to commit
the offense charged and therefore admissible when entrapment is an
issue."'
It was primarily this matter of rebuttal evidence"' which led to the
proposal of a new and completely different test, which in effect redefines
the defense, eliminating the subjective question of prior disposition and
the attendant rebuttal evidence. This new definition was put forward by
Professor Richard Donnelly, who suggested that the proper criterion be:
Was the officer's (or stool pigeon's) conduct of such a nature that only a
chronic violator would be tempted . . . if the officer uses inducement
that would reasonably overcome the resistance of one not a chronic
offender, such as pleas of desperate illness, continued and persistent
coaxing, appeals to sympathy, pity or friendship or offers of inordinate
sums of money, the court should find as a matter of law, that there was
entrapment." 2
Donnelly's dissatisfaction with the orthodox definition and formulations
was echoed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's Sherman opinion in 1958. His
feeling was that
... it is wholly irrelevant to ask if the "intention" to commit the crime
originated with the defendant or government officers, or if the criminal
conduct was the product of "creative activity" of law-enforcement of-
ficials."'
109 See Part IV-B below, Rebuttal Evidence, for the scope of rebuttal evidence allowed to
an entrapment defense.
110 United States v. Becker, supra note 102 at 1008, contains an excellent analysis by Judge
Learned Hand of the subjective nature of the entrapment defense. Interpreting the Sorrells
decision he held that mere inducement or solicitation by police did not establish the defense, as
the Government might rebut by evidence of ready compliance, similar conduct, or preformed
design, all of which go to the subjective question of defendant's prior state of mind or dispo-
sition.
Ill Part IV-B below details why the traditional rebuttal was considered objectionable.
Basically it was feared the jury would be prejudicially inflamed by knowledge of a defendant's
past disposition, if it were criminal, and tend to punish him for bad character generally rather
than for the crime charged.
112 Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, 60 YALE L. J. 1091, 1114 (1951).
113 Supra note 86 at 382.
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Rather entrapment should mean:
... that in holding out inducements they (the police) should act in such
a manner as is likely to induce the commission of crime only those per-
sons (ready and willing to commit further crimes) and not others who
would normally avoid crime and through self-struggle resist ordinary
temptations. This test shifts attention from the record and predisposi-
tion of the particular defendant to the conduct of the police and the
likelihood, objectively considered, that it would entrap only those ready
and willing to commit crime. It is as objective a test as the subject matter
permits, and will give guidance in regulating police conduct that is lack-
ing when the reasonableness of police suspicions must be judged or the
criminal disposition of the defendant retrospectively appraised." 4
This then is the proposed but yet unaccepted test of Frankfurter and Don-
nelly-a general objective definition of entrapment as unreasonably tempt-
ing police conduct rather than an individualized subjective definition as
the luring into crime of an otherwise innocent person.
In addition to these well known rival tests of entrapment there remains
a third criterion, that of reasonable cause, which is rarely discussed and
then only to be criticized." 5
Once again this test of entrapment constitutes in effect a whole new
definition, for under its standards the question is neither the orthodox in-
quiry whether the government induced the commission of a crime which
would not otherwise have occurred, nor the Donnelly-Frankfurter test
whether only chronic violators would be tempted by the particular police
conduct. Rather the question is whether the police acted reasonably under
the circumstances, that is upon reasonable suspicion." 6 Though rarely
articulated, existence of this test is demonstrated by allowance of rebuttal
evidence of reasonable suspicion through hearsay complaints" 7 or infor-
mation," hearsay being traditionally inadmissible as substantive evidence
but admissible in proof of probable cause and reasonableness."'
In summary, three criteria of entrapment have been advanced. Tradi-
114 Id. at 384.
11528 COLUM. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (1928), IOWA L. REV. 579, 584 (1959), Sherman v.
United States, supra note 86 at 383, United States v. Washington, 20 F.2d 160, 162 (D. Neb.
1927).
116 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §45(2) (1961), 44 IOWA L. REv. 578, 584 (1959), 16 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 72, 75 (1959), 60 YALE L. J. 1091, 1104 (1951) contain cases on what constitutes
reasonable grounds. Also Annot. 55 A.L.R.2d 1322, 1339 (1957), entrapment to commit of-
fense against laws regulating sales of liquor.
117 Heath v. United States, 169 F.2d 1007 (10th Cir. 1948), I.R.S. agent acting on numer-
ous complaints re defendant.
118 Cratty v. United States, 163 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1947), Bureau of Narcotics agent act-
ing on "reliable information."
119 Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), Reliable hearsay may constitute probable
cause for arrest; indeed an occasional jury instruction will even expressly adopt the criterion
of reasonable suspicion, as in Ryles v. United States, 183 F.2d 944, 945 (10th Cir. 1950).
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tionally a subjective ascertainment of whether the particular entrapped
defendant be an unwary innocent or an unwary criminal has been the
federal and majority rule. Since the 1950's some pressure has been felt
for an objective test of whether the police conduct would tempt only
chronic violators regardless of its effect on the particular defendant. And
cropping up now and then is a third test of "reasonable suspicion" which
has been little noticed or discussed.
Which among these three tests is preferrable is of course a value ques-
tion and therefore determined by one's own prejudices. The author in this
section has attempted to confine himself to a descriptive function; his
value judgments concerning these criteria will be set forth in the Conclu-
sion below.
B. Rebuttal Evidence
To understand this problem one must review briefly the trial of a typi-
cal entrapment situation. Ordinarily the prosecution's case in chief will
detail the illegal transaction and defendant's part therein without mention
of any inducement or persuasion used to secure his participation. Either
on cross-examination or by his own witnesses defendant will then raise the
defense, showing persuasion or inducement to have been used by the gov-
ernment officers or their agents. 2° Instances of police conduct which may
be shown as evidence of inducement raising the entrapment issue are
appeals based on sympathy,' friendship, 22 sickness, 23 offers of money,'
repeated or persistent solicitation. 25
120 Government instigation is the essence of the entrapment concept; inducement by a pri-
vate person thus cannot make the defense available. Papadikis v. United States, 208 F.2d 945
(9th Cir. 1953). Similarly there is no defense if a citizen approached with a counterfeiting
scheme reports it and leads on the defendant at the government's request. United States v.
Spadafora, 181 F.2d 957 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied 340 U.S. 897 (1950). But the government
must accept responsibility for paid informers and those promised immunity. Cratty v. United
States, 163 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1947), Hayes v. United States, 112 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1940).
Entrapment is also a valid defense in federal courts even though the inducement was done by
state officers. Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1956). And when one defend-
ant is induced to plan a crime with another who is not personally solicited by the government
some courts hold both defendants entrapped, the second defendant on the theory the one per-
sonally solicited was the government's unwitting agent. Klosterman v. United States, 248 F.2d
191 (3rd Cir. 1957). Others deny an agency can be so implied. United States v. Perkins, 190
F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1951).
121 Sherman v. United States, supra note 86; Lutfy v. United States, 198 F.2d 760 (9th
Cir. 1952).
122 People v. McIntyre, 218 Mich. 540, 188 N.W. 407 (1922); Sorrells v. United States,
supra note 51; United States v. Washington, 20 F.2d 160 (D. Neb. 1927).
123 State v. McKeehan, 48 Idaho 112, 279 Pac. 616 (1929) ; Butts v. United States, 273
Fed. 35 (8th Cir. 1921) ; Price v. United States, 56 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1932).
124 United States v. Lynch, 256 Fed. 983 (S.D. N.Y. 1918).
125 State v. Marquardt, 139 Conn. 1, 89 A.2d 219 (1952) ; People v. Benford, 345 P.2d 928
(Cal. 1959) ; People v. Kozakis, 102 Cal.App.2d 662, 228 P.2d 58 (1951).
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The prosecution then naturally desires to rebut the defense's evidence
of entrapment, which it has traditionally been allowed to do with proof of
prior criminal disposition, i.e. that the defendant was an unwary criminal
rather than an unwary innocent.
As was seen in discussing dealing with the various tests of entrapment,
the majority criterion involves a subjective determination, the ultimate
question being not whether the Government used persuasive activity but
whether that activity corrupted a mind and caused a needless crime:
For the defense of entrapment is not simply that the particular act wascommitted at the instance of government officials. That is often the casewhere the proper action of these officials leads to the revelation of crim-inal enterprises. The predisposition and criminal design of the defend-
ant are relevant. . . The Government in such a case is in no positionto object to evidence of the activities of its representatives in relationto the accused, and if the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of en-trapment he cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiryinto his own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon that issue. Ifin consequence he suffers a disadvantage, he has brought it upon him-self by reason of the nature of his defense. 126
In the federal system this rule allowing subjective rebuttal evidence pre-
vailed both before and after the Sorrells case and was explicitly reaffirmed
in the Sherman majority opinion that: "The accused may examine the con-
duct of the government agent: and on the other hand, the accused will be
subjected to an 'appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct
and predisposition' as bearing on his claim of innocence." 127 Nearly all
states follow the federal rule admitting this type of subjective rebuttal
evidence. 28
As for exactly what evidence is allowed to refute defendant's claim of
entrapment under this view, the classic formulation comes from Learned
Hand in the Becker case decided in 1933."' Therein it was stated that re-
buttal evidence might go to prove "an existing course of similar criminal
conduct; the accused's already formed design to commit the crime or
similar crimes; his willingness to do so, as evidenced by ready complais-
ance." And as was previously mentioned this includes evidence of past
criminal conduct 13' not necessarily limited to felonies13 1 nor convictions ,132
126 Sorrells v. United States, supra note 51 at 451.
127 Sherman v. United States, supra note 86 at 372.
128 State v. Hochman, 2 Wis.2d 410, 86 N.W.2d 446 (1957), State v. Wong Hip Chung, 74
Mont. 523, 241 Pac. 620 (1925), Johnson v. State, 36 Ala.App. 634, 61 So.2d 867 (1957), Smith
v. State, 214 Ind. 169, 13 N.E.2d 562, State v. Rainey, 187 La. 547, 166 So. 670 (1936).
129 United States v. Becker, supra note 102 at 1009.
13" Sullivan v. United States, 219 F.2d 760 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
131 Carlton v. United States, 198 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1952).
13244 IOWA L. REV. 578, 584, note 29 (1959) contains representative cases.
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or criminal reputation. 13 3 Proponents of this orthodox position point out
that such rebuttal evidence is essential to any proper determination under
either the origin of intent or creative activity formulations of the entrap-
ment definition, for both involve ascertainment of the subjective effect on
defendant of the entrapping conduct. This subjective effect is of course not
relevant to any issue in the prosecution until defendant raises the defense
of entrapment, and therefore must come in, if at all, in reply to the de-
fense's evidence of persuasion or inducement establishing entrapment.'3 4
Hand believes that this rebuttal to defendant's proof of entrapping con-
duct is vital, for "it would seem probable, that if there were no reply, it
would be impossible ever to secure convictions of any offenses which con-
sist of transactions that are carried on in secret." 1"5
In addition to subjective rebuttal evidence bearing on the defendant's
state of mind another type is occasionally found. Though the view is much
in dispute 3 some courts allow proof of reasonable suspicion by the officers
to be used in rebuttal,'37 or even require such showing to be made lest en-
trapment be found as a matter of law.3
Some however are not favorably impressed by any sort of rebuttal evi-
dence: witness Professor Donnelly of Yale" 9 and Justice Frankfurter in
his Sherman opinion. 4 ° These gentlemen maintain a third view that once
'33 Jones v. State, 321 P.2d 432 (Okl. Cr. 1956); Washington v. United States, 275 F.2d
687 (5th Cir. 1960).
134 Though some courts allow such evidence during the case in chief when it merely an-
ticipates an entrapment defense sure to be raised. Reece v. United States, 131 F.2d 186 (5th Cir.
1942), cert denied 318 U.S. 759 (1943).
1'5 Sherman v. United States, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2nd Cir. 1952).
136 Most of the comment is decidedly critical. See 16 WASu. & LEE L. REv. 72, 75 note 12
(1960); N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033, 1034 note 6 (1958) ; 49 J.C.L., C. & P.S. 447, 451 (1959); 44
IOWA L. REV. 578, 584 (1959).
137 Some of the cases allowing such proof are found in 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §45(2), p.
145 note 98.5 (1961) ; 55 A.L.R.2d 1322, 1339 (1957) ; also People v. Finkelstin 98 Cal.App.
2d 545, 220 P.2d 934 (1950) ; State v. Good, 165 N.E.2d 28 (Ohio 1961) ; Johnson v. State, 36
Ala.App. 634, 61 So.2d 867 (1952) ; Trice v. United States, 211 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1954) ; C. M.
Spring Drug Co. v. United States, 12 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1926).
138 "It is well recognized that officers may entrap one into the commission of an offense
only when they have reasonable grounds to believe that he is engaged in unlawful activities...
(I)t is incumbent on the government to prove reasonable grounds to believe that the intent
and purpose to violate the law existed in the mind of the accused." Heath v. United States,
169 F.2d 1007, 1010 (10th Cir. 1948); United States v. Certain Quantities of Intoxicating
Liquors, 290 Fed. 824 (D. New Hamp. 1923); Swallum v. United States, 39 F.2d 390 (8th Cir.
1930) ; Ryles v. United States, 183 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1950), cert. denied 340 U.S. 877 (1950).
Compare: Annot. 55 A.L.R.2d 1322, 1339 (1957) Entrapment to commit offense
against laws regulating sale of liquor; Annot. 33 A.L.R.2d 883, 886 (1954) Entrapment to
commit offense with respect to narcotics law.
139 Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, 60 YALE L. J. 1091 (1951).
140 Supra note 86 at 378.
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unusual inducement is shown a defense exists to which there can be no
reply. This refusal of rebuttal evidence proceeds on two principal grounds,
one theoretical and one practical. Theoretically, all this rebuttal evidence
bearing on the subjective element of entrapment is irrelevant if one follows
the purely objective test advanced by Donnelly in his 1951 article and ad-
vocated in Frankfurter's 1958 Sherman opinion. According to that cri-
terion the controlling question is whether the police conduct "falls below
standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper use of gov-
ernmental power." "'
This test shifts attention from the record and predisposition of the par-
ticular defendant to the conduct of the police and the likelihood, ob-
jectively considered, that it would entrap only those ready and willing
to commit crime. It is as objective a test as the subject matter per-
mits .. . 142
Again and again throughout his Sherman opinion Justice Frankfurter re-
iterates the opinion that rebuttal evidence is wholly irrelevant and imma-
terial because a
... test that looks to the character and predisposition of the defendant
rather than the conduct of the police loses sight of the underlying rea-
sons for the defense of entrapment .... Permissible police activity does
not vary according to the particular defendant concerned; surely if two
suspects have been solicited at the same time in the same manner, one
should not go to jail simply because he has been convicted before and
is said to have a criminal disposition. No more does it vary according to
the suspicions, reasonable or unreasonable, of the police concerning the
defendant's activities.' 48
Practically, objection is made against allowing, even under the majority
test including a subjective inquiry, the prosecution to prove willingness of
the defendant to indulge in the crime charged by evidence of similar
crimes, criminal reputation or ready compliance. It is claimed that:
The danger of prejudice in such a situation, particularly if the issue of
entrapment must be submitted to the jury and disposed of by a general
verdict of guilty or innocent, is evident. The defendant must either
forego the claim of entrapment or run the substantial risk that, in spite
of instructions, the jury will allow a criminal record or bad reputation to
weigh in its determination of guilt of the specific offense of which he
stands charged. 14 4
141 Id. at 382.
142 1d. at 384.
143 1d. at 383.
144 Ibid.
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In truth this fear expressed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter and others145 is not
unfounded, and the potential danger has moved California to exclude re-
buttal evidence of past crimes or criminal reputation, even while following
a subjective "origin of intent" test of entrapment that requires determina-
tion of the defendant's prior disposition and inclinations.'46 Though rele-
vant, this evidence is held to be inherently prejudicial and therefore inad-
missible. With all such evidence excluded the determination of pre-existing
criminal intent, which is essential to application of California's origin of
intent test, would seem to be nearly impossible and subject to Hand's
criticism that prosecutions for consensual crimes must practically cease.
However the California courts meet this difficulty by allowing pre-existing
criminal intent to be inferred from a number of factors, none dealing with
an individual defendant's shortcomings of character. Among these non-
prejudicial means of determining the origin of intent are readiness to
commit the crime charged, 4 ' defendant's own admissions, 14 8 court's view
that the offense is one habitually committed.'4 9
Summarizing, then, orthodox belief favors admission of any evidence
relevant to determining where the criminal intent originated, including evi-
dence of past similar criminal conduct and criminal reputation so long as
it bears on defendant's predisposition to commit the specific crime in-
volved. A strict minority objects to this as not only prejudicial in effect on
a jury but also necessarily to be excluded as immaterial. This position
reflects Donnelly and Frankfurter's purely objective definition of entrap-
ment as police conduct which would tempt even one not habitually en-
gaged in crime, an issue to which criminal reputation, prior crimes and
reasonable suspicion are simply unrelated. Another body of opinion tests
entrapment by the reasonableness of the police conduct under the partic-
ular circumstances and therefore admits rebuttal evidence of reasonable
suspicion based on hearsay or criminal reputation.
A compromise alternative to these jarring sects is offered by the Cali-
fornia courts. This approach follows the orthodox subjective inquiry (i.e.
whether the police action caused a needless crime or merely controlled the
145 See 33 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033, 1038 (1958); 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 399, 417 (1959); 49
JOURNAL C. L., C. & P. S. 447, 450; 44 IowA L. REV. 578, 587 (1959).
146 People v. Benford, 345 P.2d 928 (Cal. 1959).
147 People v. Ramos, 146 Cal.App.2d 110, 303 P.2d 783 (1956); People v. Caudillo, 138
Cal.App.2d 183, 291 P.2d 191 (1955) ; People v. Neal, 120 Cal.App.2d 329, 216 P.2d 13 (1953).
148 People v. Caudillo, supra note 147; People v. Raffington, 98 Cal.App.2d 455, 220 P.2d
967 (1950).
149 People v. Schwartz, 109 Cal.App.2d 450, 240 P.2d 1024 (1952).
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precipitation of one ready to happen). However evidence of past criminal
conduct or reputation, and of reasonable suspicion is excluded because
prejudicial, though some evidence of prior disposition (e.g. ready compli-
ance) is admissible because free from overly prejudicial connotation.
C. Question of Law or Fact
Concluding our list of disputes over trial administration of the defense
is the question whether entrapment be a matter of law to be determined by
trial and appellate judges, or a question of fact for the jury.
Traditionally, availability of entrapment as a defense has been re-
garded as a jury question whenever some evidence tends to show the crime
was a result of governmental instigation.15° All states follow this rule of
jury submission, as do the federal courts. 5' The elements of the defense
should therefore be explained to the jury in proper instruction, adapted to
the particular crime charged. What constitutes proper jury instruction
varies little among jurisdictions, an extremely common form being that
used by the California courts.
The law does not tolerate a person, particularly a law enforcement of-ficer, generating in the mind of a person who is innocent of any criminalpurpose, the original intent to commit a crime thus entrapping such per-son into the commission of a crime which he would not have committedor even contemplated but for such inducement; and where a crime iscommitted as a consequence of such entrapment, no conviction may behad of the person so entrapped as his acts do not constitute a crime.If the intent to commit the crime did not originate with the defendant
and he was not carrying out his own criminal purpose, but the crime wassuggested by another person acting with the purpose of entrapping andcausing the arrest of the defendant, then the defendant is not criminally
liable for the acts so committed.
It is important in considering the defense of entrapment to ascertainwhether the acts charged as constituting the offense were the result ofthe intent of some other person to place the accused in a position wherehe might be charged with the offense, in which event the defendant may
not be convicted or whether the defendant, acting in pursuance of his
own intent, committed the acts, such other person merely affording him
the opportunity of doing so, in which latter event the defense of entrap-
ment would not relieve the defendant of responsibility. 52
150 Discussions of the necessity for jury submission appear at Annot. 69 A.L.R.2d 1397 at
1433 (1960) Entrapment to commit bribery or offer to bribe; Annot. 55 A.L.R.2d 1322 at
1372 (1957), Entrapment to commit offense against law regulating sales of liquor; Annot. 33
A.L.R.2d 883 at 902 (1954), Entrapment to commit offense with respect to narcotics law.
151 Sorrells v. United States, supra note 51 at 452 and Sherman v. United States, supra
note 86 to 377.
152 People v. Finkelstin, 98 Cal.App.2d 545, 552; 220 P.2d 934, 941 (1950).
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Instructions in federal courts are much the same:
What do we mean by entrapment in the law? Of course, in every arrest
there is a certain amount of entrapment in order to outwit the persons
who are violating the law or who are about to violate the law. A certain
amount of deception has to be exercised in most cases. The law does not
forbid that. The type of entrapment that the law forbids is the entrap-
ment which involves originating in the mind of someone a violation of
the law, instead of inducing that person already having in mind to vio-
late the law to violate it again. In other words, the question as to
whether or not there has been the entrapment that is forbidden by the
law depends upon whether or not what is done leading up to the viola-
tion amounted to putting it in the mind of a person who had no notion
or intent of violating the law, who had no inclination heretofore to do
it, and leading him into doing it for the first time. That is the entrap-
ment that is forbidden. But as you find in this case that this man al-
ready had in his mind the desire to violate the law, regardless of whether
there is proof that he had previously violated it or not, then the law says
that this inducement is not improper, even though the actual incident
or incidents in question, these various sales, would not have occurred if
the Government agent had not been present and asked whether he could
make a purchase. That is all a question of fact, Members of the Jury,
and it is one for you to decide.' 53
Within this general acceptance of entrapment as a jury question there are
the usual leeways within which a judge may rule on matters of law, either
as to insufficiency of proof to show entrapment or as to establishment of
entrapment as a matter of law. Thus a trial judge should refuse a re-
quested instruction when it is wholly unsupported by the proof, entrap-
ment being an affirmative defense which defendant has the burden of rais-
ing.15 4
On the other hand, situations may arise wherein all evidence points to
the sole conclusion that the defendant was illegally entrapped, and the
issue may then be decided as a matter of law by the court. At the appellate
level the clearest example of this is the Sherman reversal with instruction
that the district court dismiss the indictment, based on a finding that the
Government's uncontradicted testimony showed inducement of an unwill-
ing and reforming addict.)55
153 Butler v. United States, 191 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1951). For other typical instructions see
60 YALE L. J. 1091, 1104 (1951), and 44 IowA L. REv. 578, 580 (1959).
154 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law 45(1) (1961) and Annot. 33 A.L.R.2d 883, 890 (1954), collect
authorities on this point. See also, People v. Alamillo, 113 Cal.App.2d 617, 248 P.2d 421
(1952).
155 Sherman v. United States, supra note 86. But see Masciale v. United States, 356 U.S.
386 (1958) to the effect that a defendant's undisputed testimony of solicitation will not estab-
lish entrapment as a matter of law as the jury may disbelieve said undisputed testimony.
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Basically, then, entrapment must be conceded to be a jury question
subject only to the ordinary possibilities of judge determination in cases of
extremely one-sided evidence. The primary arguments offered for jury
determination seem to be three in number. 56 First, that the entrapment
issues involve close questions of fact, turning on credibility of the defend-
ant or of the alleged entrapper, and such weighing of credibility is tradi-
tionally considered to be within the jury's peculiar competence. Second,
that the subjective way in which entrapment is traditionally defined in-
volves determination of the defendant's motivation and intent which re-
quire the collective objectivity of a jury, resulting in the composite judg-
ment of a "reasonable man" as to what those motives were. Third, that the
juries in entrapment cases express community standards, acquitting when-
ever police practices shook the common conscience, regardless of the legal
technicalities involved.
Though never explicitly stated, it also seems likely that the entrapment
defense was left to the jury because of innate judicial responsibility for
the new defense. Creating a new common law defense to criminal respon-
sibility was a difficult enough innovation, and it is not surprising that
judges should shift some of the responsibility for administering that de-
fense to the jury. However neither this reason nor the three mentioned
previously, nor the universal practice favoring jury submission convince
certain authorities. Substantial dissents, by Justices Roberts, Brandeis and
Stone in Sorrells, and by Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, Harlan and Bren-
nan in Sherman strongly urged determination of the entrapment issue by
the judges, and the same minority based their dissent in Masciale solely
on that ground. Numerous commentators have concurred in this recom-
mendation; indeed scholarly writing overwhelmingly favors judicial deter-
mination.15 Offered in support of this view have been the following argu-
ments. First, judicial decisions unlike general verdicts are controlling and
explicit precedents, giving enforcement officials definite and approved rules
as to what degree of deception and persuasion may be used. This argument
was asserted in Sherman by Mr. Justice Frankfurter as a conclusion to his
minority opinion.
Equally important is the consideration that a jury verdict, although it
may settle the issue of entrapment in the particular case, cannot give
156 This list is compiled from discussions found in the MODEL PENAL CODE, §2:10 Com-
ments, (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); 49 J.C.L., C. & P. S. 449 (1959); 16 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
72 (1959) ; 73 HARV. L. REV. 1333 (1960) as well as the offhand references and brief allu-
sions to the jury issue found in the cases researched for this paper.
157 MODEL PENAL CODE §2:10, (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); 28 FORDHAm L. REv. 399, 416
(1959) ; 49 J.C.L., C. & P. S. 447, 452 (1959) ; 33 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033, 1040 (1958) ; 60 YALE
L. J. 1091 (1951); 1 U.S.F. L. REV. 177 (1966).
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significant guidance for official conduct for the future. Only the court,
through the evolution of explicit standards in accumulated precedents,
can do this with the degree of certainty that the wise administration of
criminal justice demands.158
Second, that admission of rebuttal evidence either to show reasonable
suspicion or prior criminal inclination is dangerously prejudicial before an
untrained and emotional jury. It is feared legally unsophisticated minds
are unable to confine the effect of reputation and criminal activity to the
narrow question of prior intent, and will unavoidably use it as substantive
evidence of guilt, or in punishing defendant for a bad character rather
than the specific crime charged.15 9 Third, in answer to any argument that
entrapment involves conflicting stories and difficult determinations of dis-
puted facts, it is pointed out that questions of jurisdiction involve the same
problems but are resolved by a judge without a jury. This point is theoret-
ically extended to analogize entrapment to a jurisdictional question under
Robert's judicial purity theory.
The protection of its own functions and the preservation of the purity
of its own temple belongs only to the court. It is the province of the
court and of the court alone to protect itself and the government from
such prostitution of the criminal law. 160
To sum up, arguments can be made for both sides of the controversy, but
practice has to date decided in favor of jury determination. Whether this
is for the best, and what future developments are probable in this matter
will be discussed below in the Conclusion.
V
CONCLUSION
A reaction to abuses of the type revealed in Sherman is working toward the
looser construction advocated by the minority opinions of Justice Roberts
in Sorrells and Justice Frankfurter in Sherman. At its 1959 meeting the
American Law Institute chose Frankfurter's objective test in direct pref-
erence to the traditional subjective test.'' Considerable law review agita-
tion for this change is evident.' 62
158 Supra note 86 at 385.
159 Sorrells v. United States, supra note 51 at 458; 49 J.C.L., C. & P. S. 447, 453 (1959).
Cf. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), and majority and dissenting opinions in Spencer
v. Texas ....... U.S ....... 87 S.Ct. 648 (1967).
16°Id. at 457; 28 FORDHAm L. REV. 399, 417 (1959) ; 49 J.C.L., C. & P. S. 447, 452 (1959).
161 American Law Institute Proceedings, 36th Annual Meeting, 1959, pp. 225-34.
162 Representative of the clamor for a strictly objective test of "civilized police conduct" are
the following: 8 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 463, 467 (1961) ; 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 399, 417 (1959); 33
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033, 1039 (1958); 49 J.C.L., C. & P. S. 447, 449 (1959); and most recently,
1 U.S.F. L. REv. 177 (1966).
April 1967]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
However, my own personal analysis and observations proceed from
somewhat different premises. First, it must be accepted that entrapment is
purely judicial creation, a product of the modern common law and neither
a statutory nor constitutional necessity. We should recognize the defense
as what Learned Hand described as a "spontaneous moral revulsion" on
the part of the judiciary against prosecutorial harshness, and realize that
all theories are merely means of legitimating this emotion. The many ra-
tionalizations that have been advanced to justify the entrapment defense
should not be allowed to obscure the undeniable truth, that an entrapped
defendant has knowingly and voluntarily committed a criminal act. We
torture theory to deny his responsibility, as demonstrated by the admitted
presence of all elements of guilt when the entrapping conduct is done by
a private person:
Although there is an instinctive sympathy for the originally well-inten-
tioned defendant who is seduced into crime by persuasion and artifice,
such a defendant is just as guilty where his seducer is a police officer as
he would be if persuaded by a hardened criminal accomplice. Entrap-
ment is a defense not because the defendant is innocent but because as
stated by Justice H. Holmes (dissenting in Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S.
438, 470, 1928, an illegally obtained evidence case) 'it is a less evil that
some criminals should escape than that the Government should play an
ignoble part!' 16 3
The entrapment device does not disprove the commission of crime, it
merely implements the common feeling that innocent people should not be
tricked into unnecessary criminal acts. "The whole doctrine derives from
a spontaneous moral revulsion against using the powers of government to
beguile innocent, though ductile, persons into lapses which they might
otherwise avoid." (L. Hand in Becker v. United States'). Acquittal for
entrapment is simply a projection of the common desire that prosecutions
of this sort not be brought, a humane abberation in the criminal law. At
first blush this may seem an oversimplification. Yet an historical perspec-
tive supports this drastic analysis; such judicial adjustment of the criminal
process to relieve against prosecutorial or legislative harshness is neither
novel nor alarming. Thus Leon Radzinowicz, in his HISTORY OF THE
ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW, cites numerous instances of criminal legis-
lation being given a reasonable meaning by the courts when they deem a
literal meaning too severe,'1 or a literal meaning when reasonable inter-
pretation would require an undesirable result. 6 Similar examples of in-
10 People v. Benford, 345 P. 2d 928, 934 (Cal. 1959).
16462 F.2d 1007, 1009 (2nd Cir. 1933).
165 1 RADZINOWICZ, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW, p. 97, 434 (1948).
166 Id. p. 78, 86-8, 660, 685.
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genious interpretation are approved in Hughes' Sorrells opinion,'67 Holds-
worth lists many examples of strict, even ridiculous, reading of indictments
due in great part to the severity of the then potential punishments.,
Benefit of clergy to felons clearly not of clerical inclinations constituted a
blanket judicial commutation of unpopular mandatory death sentences.
The McNabb-Mallory civilized standards rule169 interposed the federal
judiciary between defendants and what was considered investigatorial
abuse, as does the exclusionary rule generally.
These illustrations indicate what ample precedent exists for judicial
adjustment of unwelcome statutes or prosecutorial practices; it is the
author's conviction that the whole problem of entrapment revolves around
what form that judicial adjustment should take. The three tests or criteria
of entrapment discussed above are but attempts to work out a saisfactory
means of channeling and implementing the judicial determination to pre-
vent convictions obtained by entrapment.
To accomplish that end the traditional approach, exemplified by Chief
Justice Hughes' Sorrells opinion, defines entrapment as a common law de-
fense, substantively categorizing defendants as innocent or guilty on the
basis of their readiness to commit the crime regardless of inducement. To
arrive at this subjective, individualized determination it is necessary to
have rebuttal evidence revealing prior disposition, such as reputation or
previous criminal activity. And this question is to be submitted to the jury
not only because substantive defenses are traditionally jury questions, but
also because the many disputed facts and conflicts regarding credibility
are, according to accepted belief in the jury system, questions best decided
by the collective objectivity of a jury.
Another approach, initiated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells and perpet-
uated by Donnelly' and Justice Frankfurter in Sherman, implements
judicial hostility toward entrapment practices by a bolder technique. Irked
by potential prejudice involved in weighing prior disposition these gentle-
men would have judged the nature of police activity and free a defendant
whenever police act in a way that would tempt a situational offender, i.e.
the only permissible police conduct is that which would tempt chronic
violators and no others. Moreover they demand pretrial judge determina-
tion on the basis that the civility of police conduct goes to the very juris-
diction of the court, traditionally an issue for the judge, who should with-
167 Supra note 51 at 446 et seq.
168 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, p. 616-23 (1923).
169 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449
(1957).
170 Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, 60 YALE L. J. 1091 (1951).
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hold said jurisdiction and dismiss the prosecution if offended by police
impropriety.
Finally, if an outright proponent of the reasonable suspicion test could
be found, it would be argued that entrapment is simply one form of judicial
supervision of police conduct through the power of review, that the tra-
ditional and constitutional standard of reviewing police conduct is that of
reasonableness, and accordingly, that the proper test is whether the police
acted upon reasonable grounds. This view requires evidence to show rea-
sonable suspicion, which often is the same potentially prejudicial stuff of
past criminal activity and reputation considered by many as objectionable
when admitted under the majority subjective test. Moreover hearsay inf or-
mation and complaints are material to this determination. Under this ap-
proach the decision whether the police acted reasonably is made by the
jury, which is an innovation in the sense other forms of judicial review of
police action have in the past been decided by judges without aid of a jury.
However dismissal of a prosecution for entrapment is a more comprehen-
sive question than legality of search or seizure, and perhaps allowing it to
merge into the general verdict is not overly incongruous. And the right of
judges rather than juries to review police conduct is due more to the now
abdicated magisterial role as instigator and director of pretrial investiga-
tion, before a jury had been assembled, than to any inherent superiority
over jury review of police reasonableness.
Before offering my opinion as to the respective worth of these ap-
proaches let me detail my bias. I personally have no use for the entrapment
defense. Every man has an obligation to obey the law. If he cannot resist
temptation, the law will not ordinarily excuse his ventures into antisocial
activity, whether they be chronic or situational. Entrapping tactics by the
police were not considered disagreeable enough to warrant a defense at
common law or even today in Great Britain, and I agree with that reaction-
ary position.
Unfortunately such nostalgia for the rigors of the common law is im-
practical. Occasionally a state will limit the scope of the entrapment doc-
trine, as did Florida in 1949, but there is simply no likelihood the defense
will be abolished anywhere that it now exists. 7 ' Consequently, making the
best of a bad situation, I have no objection to either the orthodox subjec-
1 71 LAws OF FLORIDA, Chap. 26325, Acts 1949, extra session; F.S.A. §838.11. Florida elim- "
inated the defense in cases of acceptance of bribes by public officials. Such legislation seems
eminently reasonable and supportable against any claim of unequal protection by virtue of
waiver through acceptance of public office. Two states, New York and Tennessee have, in the
past, refused to recognize the defense of entrapment. Comm. v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33 (N.Y.
1864) ; Roden v. State, 352 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn. 1961).
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tive test or that of reasonable suspicion, as either way the present relatively
narrow coverage of the defense would not be appreciably expanded. Indeed
it would even be possible to combine the two and acquit for entrapment
either if the police conduct were unreasonable or if reasonable but found
to have induced an otherwise innocent person. But the proposed objective
test must be rejected. On first looking into the Donnelly and Frankfurter
proposals of acquitting for any conduct that might tempt a situational of-
fender I felt two reactions. First, that the real purpose of the objective
test was to make rebuttal evidence of prior disposition or reasonable sus-
picion immaterial. Those familiar with the workings of the entrapment
defense must realize that this would vastly improve chances for acquittal.
And to again invoke Learned Hand, "Indeed it would seem probable that,
if there were no reply, (i.e. rebuttal evidence) it would be impossible ever
to secure convictions of any offenses which consist of transactions that are
carried on in secret." 1 2 Such a reduction in the rate of conviction in en-
trapment situations seems a luxury better not indulged in our present
condition of social insecurity. Second, besides eliminating necessary re-
buttal evidence, the new test itself unwisely broadens the defense because
it draws the line of permissible police conduct far short of what social
necessity and protection demand. The hallmark of permissibility according
to Frankfurter, as taken from Professor Donnelly's article, is that the
activity would tempt only chronic violators. But what would tempt only a
chronic violator? Possibly mere requests to make an illegal sale or indulge
in an illegal transaction fit this description but little else. "On the other
hand, if the officer uses inducements that would reasonably overcome the
resistance of one not a chronic offender, such as pleas of desperate illness,
continued and persistent coaxing, appeals to sympathy, pity, or friendship,
or offers of inordinate sums of money, the court should find as a matter of
law that there was entrapment." 173
Yet the tavern keeper selling to minors, the bellboy or taxi driver taking
bets, the escort service furnishing prostitutes require reassurance, gratui-
ties, and lies to overcome their criminal caution, all of which would be
outlawed because tempting to some situational violator with inhibitions
weakened by drink or financial need. I cannot but feel that those things
which would attract professional criminals and no others are so few as to
make enforcement of legislation against consensual crime nearly impos-
sible. The core of my objection to the Donnelly-Frankfurter objective test
is that its reform is built upon oversimplification. Errant mankind does not
172 United States v. Sherman, 220 F.2d 880, 882 (2nd Cir. 1952).
173 Donnelly, supra note 170 at 1114. (Footnotes in quotation omitted.)
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neatly divide into two classes, situational or chronic violators; rather the
spectrum shades gradually from hardened professional through occasional
petty larcenists to the most accidental of traffic offenders. When determin-
ing what violators should receive judicial clemency through the entrap-
ment defense it seems an excess of sympathy to design a criterion protect-
ing all .but the most reckless of criminals, those who require no persuasion
or inducement. There is proverbially a little larceny in each of us, and a
great deal in some. To deny the police use of certain tactics solely because
they might tempt those with only a little larceny, even though said tactics
are necessary to catch the more larcenous, is inferior to judging those
techniques by a standard of reasonableness, or under the orthodox test
allowing a jury to express a community judgment on whether the defend-
ant deserved protection from such entrapping tactics.
The issue of whether entrapment should be a question of law or fact,
for judge or jury, is an easier one to answer-let experience decide. No
matter what the test used, if some jurisdictions find jury submission to
work so poorly as to require change no one should object. But it simply
has not yet been demonstrated that such change is necessary and I am
therefore willing to endorse the status quo of jury determination.
Actually this entire inquiry represents an endorsement of the status
quo. In summary, the research involved in preparing this study has led me
to the definite opinion that the present defense operates well enough, that
possible evidence of reasonable suspicion could be profitably admitted, but
that no other adjustment is particularly desirable.
[Vol. I
